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by	 Josef	 Pavol	 Šafárik	 of	 1842,	 and	 it	 claims	 that	 cartographic	 imagery	 has	 played	 a	
significant	role	in	the	legitimisation	of	the	region’s	collective	identity.	It	argues	that	the	
adoption	 the	 map	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 art	 history,	 in	 order	 to	 spatialise	 and	 quantify	 the	
understanding	of	art,	cannot	bypass	the	postmodern	critique	of	the	map.	It	reflects	on	






la	 légitimation	 de	 l'identité	 collective	 de	 cette	 région.	 Ce	 faisant,	 elle	 examine	 les	
similarités	entre	les	approches	et	méthodes	de	la	cartographie	et	celles	de	l'histoire	de	
l'art,	 et	 réfléchit	 sur	 les	 avantages	 et	 dangers	 du	visual	 turn	 de	 la	 cartographie	 et	 du	
spatial	 turn	 de	 l’histoire	de	 l’art.	Elle	 soutient	que	 l'adoption	de	 la	 carte	 comme	outil	
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This	 paper	 focuses	 on	 the	 wider	 strategies	 of	
turning	space	into	an	image,	and	on	the	politics	of	
representing	 and	 classifying	 space,	 past	 and	
present.	 It	 focuses	 on	 shifting	 cartographic	
regimes	 applied	 to	 maps	 of	 Eastern	 Europe,	






The	 writings	 by	 J.	 B.	 Harley,	 Denis	 Wood,	 Denis	
Cosgrove,	 and	 many	 others	 have	 challenged	 the	
map’s	 time‐honoured	 claims	 to	 scientific	
neutrality,	revealing	instead	its	kinship	with	art,	as	
well	 as	 its	 inherent	 relationship	 with	 power.1	 As	
forcefully	argued	by	J.B.	Harley	in	one	of	his	most	
radical	 texts,	 far	 from	 presenting	 a	 neutral	 and	
objective	 record	 of	 reality	 and	 from	 translating	
three‐dimensional	 reality	onto	a	 two‐dimensional	
surface	 according	 to	 scientific	 rules,	 maps	
constitute	 a	 highly	 subjective,	 densely	 opaque,	
immensely	 biased	 and	 selective	 interpretation	 of	
this	 reality,	 which	 has	 to	 be	 disassembled,	
simplified	 and	 reassembled	 while	 using	 a	 set	 of	
cartographic	 codes.	 	 The	 map	 discriminates,	
reinforcing	 the	empowered	and	marginalising	 the	
disempowered:	
the	 distinctions	 of	 class	 and	 power	 are	
engineered,	 reified	 and	 legitimated	 in	 the	
map	by	means	of	cartographic	signs.	The	rule	
seems	 to	 be	 “the	 more	 powerful	 the	 more	
prominent.”	 To	 those	 who	 have	 strength	 in	
the	 worlds	 shall	 be	 added	 strength	 in	 the	
map.	Using	 all	 the	 tricks	 of	 the	 cartographic	
trade	 –	 size	 of	 symbol,	 thickness	 of	 line,	
height	of	 lettering,	hatching	and	shading,	the	
addition	 of	 colour	 –	 we	 can	 trace	 this	




as	 texts,	 social	 documents,	 cultural	 artefacts,	









well	 as	 unmasked	 as	 tools	 of	 imperialism	 and	
nationalism,	 which	 both	 facilitate	 and	 justify	
expansion	 and	 control.	 By	 drawing	 and	
naturalising	the	boundaries,	past	and	present,	they	
have	 been	 said	 to	 turn	 history	 into	 nature,	 fixing	
identities,	and	excluding	the	other.3			
Maps	 of	 Eastern	 Europe	 are	 no	 exception	 to	 this	
rule,	 on	 the	contrary	 they	prove	 the	primary	 role	
of	the	cartography	in	the	creation	of	the	notion	of	
the	“region”	of	Eastern	Europe,	at	the	beginning	of	
the	 20th	 century,	 as	 a	 distinct	 geographical,	
historical	 and	 geopolitical	 unit,	 and	 as	 a	 separate	
cultural	 space,	 detachable	 from	Western	 Europe,	
and	 attachable	 to	 Asia.4	 	 One	 of	 its	 primary	
features,	 however,	 is	 its	 persistent	 spatial	
indeterminacy.	The	boundaries	of	Eastern	Europe	
have	 never	 been	 fixed	 and,	 depending	 on	 the	
positionality	 of	 the	 cartographer,	 its	 space	 could	
either	 loom	large	between	the	Baltic	 in	the	north,	
Mediterranean	 in	 the	 south	 and	 the	 Ural	
mountains	 in	 the	 east,	 bridging	 Europe	 and	 Asia,	
or,	 it	 could	 also	 shrivel	 down	 to	 a	 strip	 of	 the	
“lands‐in‐between”	 that	 are	 sandwiched	
uncomfortably	 between	 Europe’s	 West	 and	 East.	
The	notorious	spatial	uncertainty	of	the	region	has	
been	 matched	 by	 the	 equally	 unstable	 lexicon	 of	
names,	 generated	 by	western	 discourse	 since	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 Its	 most	
tenacious	 qualifying	 adjective	 “Eastern”	 was	
displaced	after	1989,	freely	and	arbitrarily,	by	the	
terms	 “Central,”	 or	 “East	 Central.”	This	 seemingly	
unsolvable	linguistic	confusion,	or	rather	battle	for	
signification	 over	 the	 region’s	 geographical	
bearing	 is	 further	 complicated	 by	 an	 astonishing	
assortment	of	other	names	given	to	 it	 throughout	























with	 the	 allegedly	 innocent	 “New	 Europe”	 of	 the	
Versailles	 origins,	 to	 a	 blatantly	 instrumental	
cordon	 sanitaire.	 	 It	 soon	 resorted	 to	 increasingly	
metaphorical	 signifiers,	 such	 as,	 “marchlands,”	
“shatter	zone,”	 “the	belt	of	political	 change,	 ”	 “the	
devil’s	 belt,”	 “the	 other	 Europe,”	 as	 well	 as	 to	
direct	 indicators	 of	 political	 affiliation,	 such	 as	
“Communist	 Europe,”	 “Post‐Communist	 Europe,”	
revoking	occasionally	the	old	denomination	of	the	
“New	 Europe.”	 5	 	 Both	 the	 names	 and	 the	 maps	
have	been	instrumental	in	projecting	the	collective	
identity	 of	 the	 region,	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 its	
physical	 features,	 but	 also	 the	 notion	 of	 its	
inherent	transitoriness	and	immaturity,	as	well	as	
implying	 submissiveness,	 impurity	 and	 danger.	
Deprived	 of	 stable	 boundaries	 as	 parameters	 of	
identity,	be	it	geographical,	ethnic	or	linguistic,	the	
region	appears	to	be	a	perfect	case	in	the	point	of	
post‐structuralist	 indeterminacy,	 testifying	 that	
indeed	 there	 is	nothing	outside	 the	 text,	 and	 that	
the	map	precede	the	territory.	
The	 text	below	compares	different	visual	 regimes	
employed	 to	 represent	 the	 cultural	 and	 political	
entities	 of	 “Eastern	 Europe,”	 Communist	 Europe	
and	Post‐Communist	Europe,	beginning	from,	and	
focusing	 on	 that	 most	 remarkable	 map,	 entitled	
“Slavic	 Europe”	 and	 dating	 from	 1842.	 	 What	
follows	 is	 informed	 both	 by	 my	 experience	 as	 a	
“mapmaker”	 –	 as	 a	 contributor	 to	 John	 Onian’s	
World	Art	Atlas,6	as	well	as	by	my	research	on	the	
western	 construction	 of	 this	 region.	 The	 text	
argues	 that	 it	 is	 the	 maps	 and	 the	 cartographic	
imagery	which	have	played,	and	are	still	playing,	a	
significant	role	in	the	legitimisation	of	the	Eastern	
European	 collective	 identity.	 Examining	 the	ways	
of	mapping	art	in	Eastern	Europe,	the	text	reflects	
also	 on	 the	 overlap	 between	 the	 approaches	 and	
methods	 of	 critical	 cartography	 and	 critical	 art	
history,	that	is	on	the	mutual	benefits	and	perils	of	
the	 visual	 turn	 in	 cartography,	 and	 of	 the	 spatial	








turn	 in	 art	 history.	 	 I	 am	 going	 to	 start	 from	 the	
latter.		













from	W.	 J.	T	Mitchell’s	 re‐definition	of	 it	 from	the	
positions	 of	 post‐structuralism	 and	 Marxism‐
inspired	 inquiry	 into	 the	 ontology	 of	 the	 image.	
From	 Mitchell,	 with	 whom	 Harley	 shared	 the	
radical	 deconstructionist	 outlook	 and	 scepticism	
toward	the	neutrality	of	cultural	pronouncements,	
he	 borrowed	 the	 affirmation	 of	 the	 socially	
constructed	nature	of	visual	representation,	which	
justified	his	classification	of	maps	as	belonging	to	
the	 “broader	 family	 of	 value‐laden	 images.”9	 It	
seems,	 however,	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 obvious	
kinship	with	Mitchell’s	 inquiry	 into	 the	politics	of	
the	 image,	 it	 was	 Panofsky’s	 description	 of	 the	
progressive	stages	of	image	analysis	which	proved	
most	 influential	 on	 Harley’s	 thinking	 about	 “the	
symbolic	 dimension”	 of	 the	 map	 as	 a	 picture.	
Harley	kept	returning	to	Panofsky’s	method	many	
times	 over	 the	 period	 of	 his	 most	 intense	
production	 of	 the	 theoretical	 statements	 about	


























maps,	 adapting	 it	 for	 the	 use	 of	 the	 New	
Cartography	by	displacing	the	contents,	theme	and	
the	 intrinsic	 meaning	 of	 an	 artwork	 with	 the	
signifiers,	 topography	 and	 the	 ideology	 of	 space.	
Thus	 the	 first	 level	 of	 Panofsky’s	 ladder,	 the	
recognition	 of	 the	 “primary	 or	 natural	 subject	
matter”	 would	 be	 translated	 by	 Harley	 into	 the	
primary	 task	 of	 the	 recognition	 of	 conventional	
cartographic	signs;	 the	second	step,	 identifying	of	
the	 picture’s	 “secondary	 or	 conventional	 subject	
matter,”	 –	 would	 be	 aligned	 by	 him	 with	 the	
recognition	 of	 the	 topographical	 identity	 of	 “real	
place”	 represented	 on	 the	 map;	 and,	 finally,	 the	
last	stage	of	Panofsky’s	image	interpretation	which	
aims	 to	 decipher	 its	 broad	 symbolical	 values	 as	




Panofsky’s	method,	 criticised	 for	 its	 adherence	 to	
the	 notions	 of	 intrinsic	 meaning	 and	 given	
contexts,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 its	 indifference	 to	 social	
relations	and	politics,11	might	appear	entirely	out	
of	 tune	 with	 Harley’s	 postmodernist	 critical	
approach,	 unveiling	 the	map	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	
power‐knowledge,	 but	 it	 must	 have	 appealed	 to	
him	precisely	 for	 its	promise	 to	 identify	 a	deeper	
meaning	 behind	 every	 aspect	 of	 an	 image	 and	 to	
link	 it	 to	other	 cultural	manifestation	of	 the	 time.	
Indeed,	 he	 went	 into	 great	 lengths	 in	 order	 to	
accommodate	 what	 he	 considered	 a	 useful	
methodology	into	his	own	scholarly	apparatus.	As	
he	 wrote	 in	 1990:	 “The	 question:	 ‘what	 did	 the	
map	mean	to	the	society	that	first	made	and	used	
it?’	 is	 of	 crucial	 interpretive	 importance.	 Maps	
become	 a	 source	 to	 reveal	 the	 philosophical,	
political,	 or	 religious	 outlook	 of	 the	 period,	 or	
which	 is	 sometimes	 called	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 age.”	
But,	even	if	obviously	seduced	by	the	interpretive	
powers	 of	 iconology,	 seemingly	 capable	 of	
unveiling	 the	 totality	 of	 hidden	 meanings	








conveyed	 by	 images	 of	 the	 past,	 Harley	 would	
nonetheless	 adapt	 it	 for	 the	 use	 of	 his	 Critical	
Cartography	 by	 positioning	 the	 orthodoxies	 of	
iconology	 alongside	 other	 methods	 of	 cultural	
hermeneutics,	 such	 as	 discourse	 analysis	 and	
social	 theory,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 by	 filtering	 its	
approaches	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 his	 own	 radical	




While	 the	 latter	 reveals	 the	 tendencies	 of	
knowledge	 in	 maps	 –	 its	 hierarchies,	
inclusions	 and	 exclusions	 –	 the	 former	
examines	 how	 the	 social	 rules	 were	
translated	 into	 the	 cartographic	 idiom	 in	
terms	 of	 signs,	 styles	 and	 expressive	
vocabularies	of	cartography.12	
In	 the	 same	 way	 in	 which	 the	 New	 Cartography	
looked	 back	 into	 the	 discipline	 of	 Art	 History,	
filtering	 its	 old	 methods	 through	 critical	 theory,	
the	 use	 of	 the	 cartographic	 practices	 by	 the	 new	
strand	 of	 Spatial	 Art	 History,	 would	 also	 benefit	
from	 internalising	 the	critical	 reflection	about	 the	
mechanisms	and	perils	of	mapmaking.13		
There	 is	 no	 region	 named	 as	 Eastern	 Europe	 on	
early	modern	maps	 of	 the	 continent	 which	 focus	
on	representing	dynasties	and	kingdoms,	and	pay	
due	 tribute	 to	 the	 rulers	 who	 commissioned	
them.14	 As	 argued	 by	 Larry	 Wolf,	 it	 was	 the	
Enlightenment	 which	 invented	 the	 concept	 of	
Eastern	 Europe,	 constructing	 it	 as	 Europe’s	































as	 a	 separate	 space	 was	 made	 in	 the	 eighteenth	
century,	 it	 is	 significant	 that	 the	 emerging	
hierarchy	of	the	civilised	versus	non‐civilised	was	
visualised	 on	 the	 patterns	 borrowed	 from	
cartographic	 imagery.	 A	 striking	 example	 is	
provided	 by	 the	 allegorical	 print,	 chosen	 as	 a	
frontispiece	 in	 the	 memoirs	 of	 the	 French	
astronomer	 Chappé	 d’Auteroche,	 who	 travelled	
from	 Paris	 through	 the	whole	 Europe	 to	 observe	
the	 transit	 of	 Venus	 in	 Siberia	 in	 1761.	 The	
engraving,	 entitled	 “Carte	 Générale:	 La	 France	 et	
l’Empire,	la	Pologne	et	la	Russie,”	was	made	by	the	
French	 artist	 Jean	 Baptiste	 Le	 Prince,	 who	
accompanied	 the	 astronomer	 on	 his	 journey,	
producing	a	series	of	orientalising	representations	
of	 everyday	 life	 in	 European	 and	 Asiatic	 Russia	
(Fig.	 1).16	 The	 cartographic	 element	 of	 the	 image	
consists	 of	 the	 journey’s	 graphic	 itinerary,	
complete	 with	 cities	 and	 major	 rivers,	 which	 is	
inscribed	 prominently	 on	 the	 curtain	 at	 the	
background.	 It	 leads	 from	 Paris	 to	 Mainz,	
Strasbourg	and	Vienna,	and	further	to	Warsaw,	St	
Petersburg	 and	 Moscow,	 ending	 in	 the	 most	
remote	town	of	Tobolsk	in	Siberia.	If	the	itinerary	
serves	 as	 an	 index	 to	 confirm	 the	 real	 presence	
and	 the	 empirical	 status	 of	 the	 observations,	 the	
message	 of	 the	map	 is	 conveyed	 by	 its	 figurative	
part,	 through	 the	 allegorical	 juxtaposition	 of	 the	
stately	 personifications	 of	 France	 and	 the	 Holy	
Roman	 Empire	 to	 the	 humble	 figures	 of	 Poland	
and	 Russia.	 In	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 first	 two	
figures,	imperial,	brightly	lit,	draped	in	sumptuous	
classical	 attire	 and	 displaying	 the	 royal	 insignia	 ‐	
the	 figures	 of	 Poland	 and	 Russia,	 pushed	 to	 the	
back	and	cast	 in	shadow,	are	marked	as	diffident,	
insecure	 and	 powerless.	 Stripped	 from	 any	
emblems	which	 could	 testify	 to	 their	 actual	 royal	
status	 as	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 ancient	
Kingdom	 of	 Poland	 and	 the	 powerful	 Russian	
Tsardom	of	Catherine	 the	Great,	 they	are	dressed	









in	 quasi‐ethnic	 costumes	 and	 hold	 military	
weapons,	suitable	for	low‐ranking	soldiers,	such	as	
a	bow	and	a	halberd:	one	is	sitting	directly	on	the	
ground,	 and	both	of	 them	 look	up	 to	 the	western	
sovereigns,	 who	 seem	 entirely	 oblivious	 of	 their	
presence.	 	 It	 is	not	difficult	 to	 see	 that	 the	 spatial	
configuration	of	the	personifications	of	France,	the	
Holy	Roman	Empire,	Poland	and	Russia	 is	heavily	
indebted	 to	 the	 common	 theme	 of	 the	 cartouche	
iconography	 in	 the	 17th	 century	 maps,	 in	 which	
allegorical	 figures	 standing	 for	 Asia,	 Africa	 and	
Americas	 bow	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 Europe,	 always	








                                                          
17	For	examples,	see,	 for	 instance,	Michael	Wintle,	The	 Image	of	Europe:	Visualizing	
Europe	in	Cartography	and	Iconography	Throughout	the	Ages	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	






By	 juxtaposing	 the	 disempowered	 monarchies	 of	
Poland	 and	 Russia	 to	 the	 enthroned	 figures	 of	
France	 and	 Germany,	 the	 print	 adapts	 the	




If	 in	 Le	Prince’s	map,	 its	 cartographic	 component	
acquired	meaning	from	the	allegorical	scene,	along	
with	 the	 vanishing	 of	 the	 cartouche	 imagery,	 the	
ideological	 message	 would	 be	 conveyed	 by	 the	
very	 language	 of	 the	 cartographic	 sign	 system.18	
By	 the	early	19th	 century,	 the	spatial	hierarchy	of	
Europe,	 and,	 to	 be	 precise,	 of	 its	 Eastern	
peripheries,	 has	 changed	 almost	 beyond	
recognition.	 The	 Polish	 and	 Lithuanian	
Commonwealth	was	 swallowed	 by	 the	 expanding	
empires	of	Prussia,	Russia,	Austria,	completing	the	
process	 of	 disappearing	 countries	 of	 this	 region	
from	 the	 map.	 The	 Kingdoms	 of	 Hungary	 and	
Bohemia	 had	 become	 parts	 of	 the	 Habsburg	
Monarchy	in	the	16th	century;	Bulgaria	and	Serbia	
and	many	smaller	principalities,	such	as	Moldavia,	
Walachia,	 had	 fallen	 prey	 to	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	
throughout	 the	 Middle	 Ages.	 Before	 the	 Austria‐
Hungarian	 compromise	 of	 1867,	 the	 eastern	
peripheries	 of	 the	 political	 maps	 of	 Europe	were	
uniformly	 covered	 by	 the	 vast	 overflowing	
territories	of	 the	Great	Empires.19	The	nineteenth	
century,	 however,	 was	 also	 the	 period	 of	 an	
increased	 effort	 to	 assemble	 an	 encyclopaedic	
body	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	 world	 and	 its	
inhabitants,	 to	 describe,	measure,	 and	 classify	 all	
the	 aspects	 of	 nature	 and	 culture,	 including	
languages,	 ethnicities	 and	 races.20	 Even	 if	 the	
underlying	 principle	 was	 the	 justification	 of	 the	
occidocentric	 hierarchy	 of	 civilisations	 and	 the	
imperial	 conquest,	 it	 did	 re‐introduce	 the	














subjugated	 nations	 of	 eastern	 parts	 of	 Europe	 to	
the	 ethnographic	maps	and	atlases.	A	part	of	 this	
process	was	the	discovery	of	Slavic	Europe.21	As	if	
the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 old	 Eastern	 European	
nation	states	from	the	map	was	to	be	compensated	
by	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Slavic	 myth,	 which	 to	 a	
large	 extent	was	 created	 by	 the	 Slavs	 among	 the	
Eastern	Europeans	themselves.		
And,	importantly,	one	of	the	most	powerful	visual	
manifestations	 of	 this	myth	was	 again	 a	map,	 an	
unprecedented	map,	 a	modern	ethnographic	map	
of	 Slavdom,	offering	 the	 first	 image	of	 the	 region,	
defined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 shared	 Slavonic	
languages,	 and	 delineating	 an	 imagined	 linguistic	
community,	the	world	of	Panslavism	(Fig.	2).22	The	
map,	named	as	Slovanský	zeměvid	(survey	of	Slavic	
lands)	 and	 published	 in	 1842,	 was	 painstakingly	
compiled	 by	 Pavol	 Jozef	 Šafárik,	 a	 Slavonic	
philologist,	who	spent	many	years	collecting	 local	
maps	 and	 establishing	 original	 Slavic	 names	 of	
towns	and	villages,	fitting	them	into	his	taxonomy	
of	 Slavdom.	 Born	 in	 Slovakia	 (then	 part	 of	 the	
Kingdom	of	Hungary),	educated	in	Jena	University	
in	Germany,	active	in	Novi	Sad	in	Serbia	and	then	
in	 Prague,	 Šafárik	 was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 modern	
scholars	 who	 significantly	 contributed	 to	 the	
establishment	 of	 Slavic	 studies,	 and	whose	work,	
to	 borrow	 from	Seton‐Watson,	 “had	 a	 very	direct	





































political	 hearing	 upon	 the	 whole	 development	 of	
the	 Slav	 world.”23	 The	 map,	 initially	 meant	 to	
accompany	 Šafárik’s	 earlier	 book,	 Slavonic	
Antiquities	 of	1837,	was	eventually	published	 five	
years	 later	 in	 his	 Slovanský	 národopis	 (Slav	
Ethnography),	 which	 contains	 the	 basic	 data	 on	








The	 map	 shows	 the	 Slavs	 as	 a	 unified	 “single	
body,”	 uniformly	 green,	 covering	 a	 vast	 area	 of	
Europe,	and	clearly	distinguished	against	the	non‐
Slavic	peoples	of	 the	Balkans,	 such	as	Hungarians	
and	 Romanians,	 and	 of	 course	 against	 the	
Germans.	 The	 green	 colour	 has	 been	 chosen	 to	
delineate	 Slavonic	 lands	 including	Russia	 –	 hence	
the	map	spread	far	into	the	East	reaching	the	river	
Volga.	 Non‐Slavic	 ethnic	 groups,	 however,	 are	
excluded,	 not	 only	 the	 Germans,	 but	 also	
Hungarians,	Romanians	and	Estonians,	all	of	them	
marked	 in	 contrasting	 colours,	 as	 being	 “the	
Other.”		Colour	is	clearly	loaded	with	significance	–	
and	 as	 discovered	 by	 Josef	 Hůrský,	 studying	








Šafárik’s	 papers,	 the	philologist	 has	 chosen	 green	
for	 its	association	with	hope.25	The	map	does	not	
distinguish	 between	 West	 Slavs,	 East	 Slav	 and	
South	Slavs,	although	the	map’s	legend	does	follow	
this	 well	 established	 taxonomy.	 The	 physical	
features	 of	 the	 territory	 –	 apart	 from	 rivers	 and	
larger	 mountains,	 are	 deemphasised	 Šafárik	 is	
obviously	 not	 keen	 on	 those	 anthropographic	
theories	 which	 would	 associate	 the	 Slavs	 with	
uniform	planes,	or	marches	–	and	in	fact	a	chapter	
on	 the	Slavic	 landscape	 in	his	Slavonic	Antiquities	
is	 subdivided	 into:	mountains,	 rivers,	 and	 cities.26	
The	 Slav	 enclave	 of	 Lusatia	 within	 Saxony	 is	
clearly	shown,	and	the	map	makes	clear	that	many	
Slavs	 are	 at	 home	 in	 parts	 of	 Germany	 and	 of	
course	 within	 the	 Austrian	 Crownlands.		
Obviously,	 what	 counts	 is	 the	 unity	 and	 the	
vastness	of	 the	territory	occupied	by	the	Slavs,	as	
well	as	 their	sheer	number,	80	million	 in	 total,	as	
summed	 up	 in	 the	 book.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	
uniformity	of	the	green,	all	political	borders,	in	red	










German	 names	 into	 their	 Slavic	 version	 (mostly	
into	Czech),	thus	laying	bare	the	Slavic	roots	of	the	
territories	 it	 covered,	 the	 map	 turned	 into	 a	
“counter‐map,”	 participating	 in	 the	 battle	 for	
signification	to	subvert	the	emerging	cartographic	
power,	 and	 the	 rising	 threat	 of	 a	newly	emerging	
notion	 of	Mitteleuropa,	 perceived	 by	 the	 Slavs	 as	
directly	 linked	 with	 a	 threat	 of	 a	 Germanic	
hegemony.	
The	 omnipresence	 of	 the	 Slavic	 language	
demonstrates	 that	 the	 history	 and	 culture	 of	 the	
                                                          
25	Hůrský,	“Vznik	a	poslání	Šafaříkova	Slovanského	Zeměvidu”,	20.			








Slavs,	 even	 if	 deprived	 of	 their	 own	 archival	
records	–	and	hence	ignored	by	Kant	and	by	Hegel,	
is	 preserved,	 in	 the	 truly	 Herderian	 spirit,	 in	
language.	 To	 borrow	 a	 term	 from	Gayatri	 Spivak,	
this	 map	 constituted	 the	 first	 “strategically	
essentialist”	attempt	 to	 forge	a	Slavonic	collective	
identity,	 united	 by	 language,	 folk‐culture,	 and	 by	
the	Herderian	mission	of	spiritual	regeneration	of	
the	 whole	 of	 Europe.28	 It	 was	 an	 act	 of	 cultural	
resistance	 to	 the	 imperial	 policies	 and	 the	
denigration	of	 the	Slavs	as	barbarians	by	western	
philosophers	 and	 historians.	 As	 argued	 by	 Hans	
Kohn,	Šafárik	“wished	not	only	to	be	a	scholar	but	
the	prophet	of	the	national	awakening	of	his	race,	
which	 he	 glorified,	 stressing	 apologetically	 its	
unique	character	and	mission.”29	
Šafárik’s	map	proved	immensely	successful.	It	was	
used	 by	 many	 subsequent	 ethnographic	 surveys,	
such	 as	 the	 one	 by	 Karl	 Sprunner,	 or	 Heinrich	
Berghaus,30	 thus	 establishing	 the	 cartographic	
codes	 for	mapping	 Slavic	 Europe	 on	 the	 terms	 of	
the	 Slavic	 mapmaker,	 re‐inscribing	 the	 West’s	
other	 as	 the	 Slavic	 Self.	 	 The	 book,	 translated	
straightaway	 into	 Polish	 and	 Russian,31	 with	 the	
map	neatly	folded	at	its	back	in	an	inconspicuously	
Baedecker	manner,	made	also	a	huge	impact	on	its	
Slavic	 readers,	 breeding	 an	 imagined	 community	
of	 the	 Slavs,	 as	 well	 as	 instigating	 the	 wave	 of	
ethnic	 pilgrimages	 across	 	 Slavic	 countries.	 As	
reported	by	Kohn,	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	Illyrian	
movement	 Stanko	 Vraz,	 wrote	 from	 Zagreb	 to	
Prague:	 “When	 I	 brought	 a	 copy	 of	 this	map,	 the	
local	 patriots	 and	 even	 the	 non‐patriots	 almost	
tore	it	out	of	my	hands.	All	of	them	cannot	get	over	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 Slav	nation	 is	 spread	 so	 far.	 The	
map	 arouses	 more	 patriots	 here	 than	 a	 whole	
literature	could	do.”32	 	 	Even	if	Šafárik	 ’s	map	had	

















come	 came	 about	 before	 the	 establishment	 of	 art	
history	 faculties	 in	 universities,	 it,	 	 arguably,	
introduced	 a	 “spatial	 turn”	 	 which	 affected	 the	
whole	 discipline	 of	 Slavic	 studies,	 helping	 to	
change	 it	 from	 an	 almost	 “exclusively	 linguistic	
and	philological	enterprise,”	 	 into	a	much	broader	
Slavic	 antiquarianism,	 including	 archaeology,	 and	
later	on	art	history	as	well.33	Finally,	to	restate	the	
political	aspect	of	the	map,	it	was	interpreted	as	a	
powerful	 script	 of	 cultural	 resistance	 against	 the	
Germans	already	by	 its	contemporaries,	seen	as	a	
rallying	call	that	led	to	the	First	Slavic	Congress	in	
Prague	 in	 1848,	 which	 concluded	 with	 Šafárik’s	
speech.34	
Could	 we	 say	 then,	 that	 Šafárik’s	 map,	 by	 giving	
the	 voice	 to	 the	 oppressed,	 transgressed	 the	
limitations	of	the	map	as	an	instrument	of	power,	
showing	 its	 potential	 as	 a	 vehicle	 of	 resistance?		
There	 is	no	 straightforward	answer.	The	 contrast	
between	 the	 emerald	 green	 of	 the	 Slavs	 and	 the	




their	 linguistic	 identity	 in	 the	 surrounding	 sea	 of	
Slavic‐speaking	peoples.35	 Inclusion	 is	always	and	
inevitably	related	to	exclusion.	
Despite	 the	 initial	 enthusiasm,	 Panslavism	 soon	
lost	its	electrifying	power,	when	it	was	turned	into	
a	political	tool	of	the	voracious	Russian	empire.		In	
a	 series	 of	 comic	 maps	 of	 Europe,	 composed	 of	
caricatural	 personifications	 of	 nation	 states,	 and	
produced	between	mid‐1850s	and	the	outbreak	of	
WWI	in	many	different	variations	and	languages,	a	
recurring	 trope	 is	 the	 failure	 of	 Panslavism,	




                                                          
33	 On	 the	 linguistic	 origins	 of	 Slavic	 studies,	 see,	 among	 others,	 Florin	 Curta,	 The	
Making	of	the	Slavs:	History	and	Archaeology	of	the	Lower	Danube	Region,	C.	500‐700	

















It	 was	 this	 absence	 which	 was	 to	 constitute	 the	
most	 powerful	 discourse	 of	 submission	 and	





to	 specific	 racial	 types	 and	 political	 systems.	
Notoriously	 described	 as	 deprived	 of	 natural	
geographical	 boundaries,	 and	 composed	 of	
marshes	and	steppes,	Eastern	Europe	was	said	 to	
remain	 naturally	 accessible	 to	 penetration	 both	
from	East	 and	West,	 unable	 to	 resist	 the	 invader.	
The	 discourse	 was	 forcefully	 articulated	 by	
Halford	 Mackinder,	 the	 “father	 of	 British	
Geopolitics.”	His	small	hand‐drawn	map	of	Eastern	
Europe,	published	in	his	groundbreaking	text	“The	
Geographical	 Pivot	 of	 History,”	 of	 1904,	 was	
instrumental	 in	setting	one	of	the	most	persistent	
regimes	 of	 truth	 about	 the	 region	 (Fig.	 4).37	
Surprisingly,	 Mackinder’s	 map	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
one	 of	 the	 first	 cartographic	 images	 of	 Eastern	
Europe	 as	 a	 separate	 space,	 framed	 and	 named,	
harking	 back	 to	 both	 to	 Herder	 and	 to	 the	
Enlightenment,	 and	 originating	 the	 regime	which	
still	 dominates	 not	 just	 geography	 and	 history	
books,	 but	 also	 art	 history,	 poetry,	 films	 and	
novels.	 It	 keeps	 associating	 Eastern	 Europe	 with	
                                                          
37	Halford	Mackinder,	“The	Geographical	Pivot	of	History,”	Geographical	Journal	23	
(1904):	424;	Murawska‐Muthesius,	“Mapping	the	New	Europe,”	14‐15.	
“slow‐flowing	 rivers”	 and	 quoting	 Michael	
Bradbury,	 “endless	 invaders	 who,	 from	 every	








A	 breakthrough	 in	 the	 cartographic	 regimes	
applied	to	the	eastern	parts	of	Europe	came	during	
WWI,	 when	 the	 body	 of	 the	 “New	 Europe”	 as	 a	
novel	 political	 entity	 was	 carved	 from	 the	
territories	 of	 the	 fallen	 empires	 during	 the	 Peace	
conference	 in	 Versailles.	 The	 New	 Europe	
excluded	Russia,	one	of	the	oppressors,	absorbing	
instead	 all	 the	 countries	 liberated	 from	 imperial	
subjugation,	 including	 both	 Slavic	 and	 non‐Slavic	
ones.		A	totally	new	code	was	needed,	a	new	image	
which	 had	 to	 abandon	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 vastness,	
horizontality,	 and	 cultural	affinity	 stemming	 from	
the	 shared	 linguistic	 basis,	 to	 generate	 a	 new	
common	 denominator	 for	 this	 array	 of	 states	 of	
Europe.	And	again,	 it	was	 the	 cartographic	 image	
which	 lay	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 new	 discourse:	 	 the	








famous	 “redrawn	 map	 of	 Europe,”	 laboriously	
conceived	 at	 the	 Trianon	 table,	 and	 bringing	 into	
existence	a	bunch	of	‘small	states’	in	the	middle	of	
the	 continent.39	 	 Slavic	 vastness	 shrivelled	 to	 a	
narrow	 belt	 of	 Zwischeneuropa	 (Fig.	 5).	 Although	
intended	 as	 emancipatory,	 restoring	 sovereignty	
to	 the	 oppressed	 nations	 in	 tune	 with	 the	
Wilsonian	principle	of	self‐determination,	this	new	
formula	 which	 visualised	 the	 whole	 cluster	 of	
those	small	states,	crowded	uncomfortably	one	on	
top	 of	 another	 within	 in	 narrow	 stretch	 of	 land	
separating	 Germany	 from	 Russia.	 Above	 all,	 it	
initiated	 a	 new	 discourse	 on	 the	 essential	
smallness	 and	 the	 “newness”	 of	 the	 region,	
stressing	 homogeneity	 and	 instability	 of	 this	
region,	 as	well	 as	 its	 separateness	 from	 the	main	
body	 of	 Europe.	 It	 prompted	 an	 enduring	
cartographic	 trope	 of	 mapping	 the	 middle	 of	
Europe	 as	 a	 single	 vertical	 portrait,	 squashed,	
framed	 and	 separated	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
continent.	This	code	was	soon	naturalised	into	the	
most	 suitable	 way	 of	 understanding	 this	 part	 of	
Europe,	and	has	been	endlessly	repeated	until	the	
beginning	of	 this	century,	disseminating	 the	same	
message	 of	 inherent	 political	 instability	 and	
inherent	narrative	of	fragmentation.40					
The	 Cold	 war	 era	 and	 the	 metaphor	 of	 the	 Iron	
Curtain	 brought	 yet	 another	 generation	 of	 maps	
and	 aggressive	 cartographic	 diagrams	 in	 the	
western	 media.	 The	 discourse	 of	 submission	
returned	 to	 the	 forefront,	 and	 a	 plethora	 of	
thematic	 maps	 and	 related	 images	 in	 history	
books,	 illustrated	 magazines	 and	 films,	 almost	
obsessively	 emphasised	 the	 separateness	 of	 the	
Iron	 Curtain	 countries,	 repeatedly	 evoking	 the	
notion	of	emptiness,	the	sense	of	loss	and	of	utter	
horror	 associated	 with	 the	 space	 both	 trapped	
behind,	and	defined	by,	the	Iron	Curtain	(Fig.	6).41	
The	Oxford	Atlas	of	European	History,	in	the	comic‐
like	 sequence	of	 the	history	of	Europe	 from	1914	
to	1950,	by	using	a	colour	code	asserts	the	lack	of	
sovereignty	of	Eastern	European	countries,	which	
are	 left	 colourless,	 not	 only	 while	 under	





post‐Versailles	 Europe	 (Fig.	 7).	 Sovereign	 or	 not,	
the	 cartographic	 regime	 fixes	 Eastern	 Europe	 as	
colonisable	 territories,	 deprived	 of	 their	 own	









It	 was	 the	 moment	 when	 the	 axiological	
cartographic	 codes	 converged	with	 the	 dominant	
narratives	 of	 Western	 art	 history.	 During	 the	
period	 of	 the	 Cold	War,	 it	 systematically	 avoided	
the	 topic	 of	 Eastern	 European	 art,	 in	 contrast	 to	
the	 steady	 production	 of	 history	 and	 geography	
books.43	As	if	the	region	had	too	much	history,	but	
was	deprived	of	art.	This	notion	of	domination	and	











when	 Eastern	 Europe	 found	 itself	 outside	 the	
Roman	 Empire,	 permeates	 the	 whole	 set	 of	 the	
thematic	 maps,	 which	 illustrate	 the	 spread	 of	
culture	 in	 German	 historical	 and	 art‐historical	














Culture	 in	 general,	 and	 art	 history	 in	 particular,	
were	 defined	 there	 from	 the	 position	 of	 the	
mapping	Self,	 that	 is	as	 spread	almost	exclusively	
                                                          
44	Hans	Zeisssig	ed.,	Neue	Geschichts‐	und	Kulturatlas	von	der	Urzeit	zur	Gegenwart	
(Hamburg,	Frankfurt,	Munich:	Atlantik	Verlag,	1950).		
from	 West	 to	 East.	 It	 was	 associated	 with	 the	
traces	 of	 Roman	 influence,	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	
western	 terms	 for	 institutions,	 such	 as	
universities,	with	the	spread	of	Gothic	style	(Fig.	8)	
and	 with	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 Bible	 into	
vernacular	 languages.	 It	 excluded	 Orthodox	




9).45	 In	 response	 to	 the	 imperialist	 claims	 of	
German	and	Viennese	art	history,	art	historians	in	
Poland	 and	 Czechoslovakia	 de‐emphasised	









	The	 Fall	 of	 the	Wall,	 paradoxically,	 strengthened	
the	 parameters	 of	 the	 old	 discourse,	 accelerating	
and	 intensifying	 the	 production	 of	 difference.	
Numerous	encyclopaedias,	new	history	books,	and	
new	atlases	have	been	mobilised	in	the	attempts	to	
fix	 the	 sliding	meaning	 of	 the	 Other	 Europe.47	 In	
recent	 thematic	 maps	 of	 the	 globe	 from	 tabloid	
pages	 and	 websites	 which	 warn	 against	 global	











dangers	 to	 humankind,	 Eastern	 Europe	 has	
appeared,	 almost	 invariably,	 in	 its	 old	 guise,	 not	
only	 separate	 from	Western	 Europe,	 but	 marked	
as	 a	 space	 of	 “impurity	 and	 danger,”	 of	








This	 was	 also	 the	 time,	 when	 a	 significant	
community	 of	 artists,	 curators	 and	 art	 historians,	
joining	 other	 engaged	 intellectuals,	 entered	 the	
battle	 for	signification	for	the	repositioning	of	 the	
image	 of	 Eastern	 Europe.	 And	 the	medium	of	 the	
map	 played	 again	 its	 role.	 The	most	 striking	 one	
was	 the	East	Art	Map	project	of	 the	Slovenian	art	
group	IRWIN,	initiated	in	2001	(Fig.	10).	It	aims	to	
reconstruct	 “the	missing	history	 of	 contemporary	





interactive	 cube	 on	 the	 website,	 standing	 for	 the	
“East	bloc”;	opens	itself	with	a	click	of	the	mouse,	
pouring	out	names	of	artists	and	PDF	essays	about	









was	 recently	 debated	 at	 the	 symposium	East	Art	Map:	History	 is	Not	Given.	Please	
Help	to	Construct	It,	University	College	London,	3	June	2012.	
them.	 The	 closeness	 of	 the	 archival	 box	 is	
surpassed	by	an	expanding	cosmographic	vision	of	
a	new	galaxy	of	stars	and	planets	which,	as	 if	put	
into	 motion	 by	 a	 Bing‐bang,	 are	 spreading	 ad	
infinitum	 into	 the	 space	 of	 the	 global	 art	 world.	
The	 East	 Art	 Map	 has	 been	 devised,	 similarly	 to	
Šafárik’s	 Slovanský	 zemevid,	 as	 the	 map	 of	
resistance.	 Interestingly,	 it	 transgresses	 any	
cartographic	predetermined	codes	as	 it	dispenses	
entirely	 with	 the	 region’s	 boundaries,	 and	
constructs	 its	 image	as	performance,	 from	the	set	
of	dots	and	links	between	them.	Instead	of	a	fixed	
image	it	presents	a	network	of	spatialised	data,	in	
constant	 motion.	 Are	 there	 any	 hierarchies	 and	
exclusions	 in	 operation	 at	 this	 point?	 Inevitably,	
the	positionality	of	 the	mapmakers,	 their	agendas	
and	 aims,	 determine	 the	 image.	Only	 avant‐garde	
artists	have	been	granted	entrance	to	the	cube	and	
to	 the	 constellation	 of	 stars;	 the	 only	 links	 that	
matter	 are	 those	with	 the	West,	 ignoring	 the	 rest	







a	performative	act,	 a	 spatial	 activity	 incorporated	
into	the	creation	and	communication	of	individual	
and	group	identity.”50	Space,	as	much	as	history,	is	
not	 given,	 and	 remains	 under	 the	 continuous	
process	of	construction.			
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